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Abstract 
Models of cognitive development suggest that cognitive control, a complex construct that 
ensures goal-directedness even in the face of distractions, is still maturing across adolescence. 
In the present study, we investigated how the ability to dynamically adjust cognitive control 
develops in this period of life, as indexed by the magnitude of the congruency sequence effect 
(CSE) in conflict tasks, and how this ability might relate to lapses of attention (mind-
wandering, MW). To these ends, participants from four age groups (12-13, 14-15, 18-20 and 
25-27 year-olds) completed confound-minimized variants of the flanker and Simon tasks, 
along with a Go/No Go task with thought probes to assess their frequency of mind-
wandering. The CSE was present in both tasks, but was not affected by age in either of them. 
In addition, the size of the CSE in the flanker, but not in the Simon task was negatively 
associated with the frequency of MW with awareness. Trait MW and the probability of 
reporting MW during the task was found to increase with age in accordance with cognitive 
resource views of MW. Our findings suggest that at the behavioural level there are no 
substantial developmental changes through the adolescent period in control adjustment ability 
as measured by the CSE. Response inhibition performance in the Go/No Go task, however, 
improved significantly with age. The implications of the present results for the conflict 
monitoring account of the CSE and extant theories of MW are discussed.    
 
Manuscript Word Count (including abstract):   
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Cognitive control refers to a collection of processes involved in setting and adjusting 
attentional biases in order to carry out goal-relevant actions (Gratton, Cooper, Fabiani, Carter, 
& Karayanidis, 2018). According to multiple models of development, these processes are still 
maturing and improving across adolescence (e.g., Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Luna, 
Marek, Larsen, Tervo-Clemmens, & Chahal, 2015; Luna & Wright, 2015; Steinberg, 2008; 
Steinberg et al., 2016); a period of life defined here as beginning around the age of 10 and 
lasting XQWLO RQH¶V PLG-twenties (Casey, 2015; Shulman et al., 2016). Neurobiological 
findings support the notion of protracted development as many control-related brain areas are 
still maturing and their activation patterns are still changing across this developmental period 
(for reviews, see Casey, Galvan, & Hare, 2005; Casey & Jones, 2010; Luna et al., 2015), such 
as those of the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Gogtay et al., 2004; Spear, 2000) or the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; Eshel, Nelson, Blair, Pine, & Ernst, 2007). 
At the behavioural level, aspects of cognitive control are often gauged with the help 
of response inhibition tasks. Response inhibition is a component process of cognitive control 
that involves overcoming prepotent but momentarily goal-irrelevant responses in favour of 
goal-relevant ones (Gratton et al., 2018). Some studies have shown protracted maturation of 
response inhibition across adolescence as indicated by the rate of successful performance on 
tasks that require participants to withhold a dominant response that temporarily becomes 
incorrect (e.g., stop-signal tasks, Vink et al., 2014, or Go/No Go tasks, Braet et al., 2009; 
&DUULHUH&KH\QH6ROPDQ	6PLOHN/XQD3DGPDQDEKDQ	2¶+HDUQRubia et 
al., 2006; Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 2011; Stawarczyk, 0DMHUXV&DWDOH	'¶$UJHPEHDX
2014). Studies using conflict tasks, on the other hand, have yielded somewhat inconsistent 
results. In these tasks, participants have to identify a task-relevant stimulus dimension while 
ignoring a task-irrelevant dimension. On congruent trials, the two dimensions prime the same 
response, whereas on incongruent trials, the irrelevant dimension primes an incorrect 
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response. Performance is typically slower and less accurate on incongruent compared to 
congruent trials, a difference known as the interference or congruency effect. Some studies 
investigating adolescence found that the magnitude of the interference effect decreases with 
age (e.g., Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; Marsh et al., 2006; at least up to a certain 
point, e.g., 14-15 years of age, Waszak, Li, & Hommel, 2010), others found that it increases 
in reaction times (e.g. Duell et al., 2018; Rubia et al., 2006), but decreases in accuracy (e.g., 
Duell et al., 2018), while some found no change in the effect across adolescence at all (e.g., 
Adleman et al., 2002; Andrews-Hanna, Mackiewicz Seghete, Claus, Ruzic, & Banich, 2011; 
Veroude, Jolles, Croiset, & Krabbendam, 2013). This heterogeneity across studies might be 
in part due to methodological differences, e.g., the type of conflict task that was used, or the 
particular age ranges that were investigated.    
Irrespective of the exact developmental pattern in behavioural interference resolution, 
it is clear that interference has an effect on performance in all age groups. One aspect of 
cognitive control that has received relatively little attention in the developmental literature 
thus far is how inhibitory control is adjusted dynamically in response to the occurrence of 
interference. It has been shown that the magnitude of the interference effect is modulated by 
the congruency of the previous trial, such that the congruency effect is smaller following 
incongruent compared to congruent trials (Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & 
Notebaert, 2014a; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992); a sequential modulation known as the 
congruency sequence effect (CSE). According to the most prominent account of the CSE, the 
conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004), this effect reflects a dynamic, top-down adjustment of control levels 
after conflict is detected by a dedicated conflict monitoring unit. At the neural level, the 
effect is considered to be a consequence of communication between the ACC which is 
responsible for the detection of conflict, and the dorsolateral PFC which is thought to 
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modulate control levels (Botvinick et al., 2001; 2004). Because maturation of the cognitive 
system across adolescence is characterized by the refinement of communication between 
different neural systems supporting cognitive control (Luna et al., 2015), the CSE might be 
particularly sensitive to developmental changes in this period. 
Therefore, the present study was designed to investigate how the ability to 
dynamically adjust control in such a manner changes across adolescence at the behavioural 
level, if at all. However, certain regularities in the task sequence of typical conflict tasks can 
make it difficult to interpret the CSE purely as an indicator of dynamic control adjustments 
(Duthoo et al., 2014a; Egner, 2007; Schmidt, 2013). We will briefly outline these learning- 
and memory-related confounds, to illustrate their effect on the interpretation of the CSE, and 
to highlight the importance of controlling for them.  
 In standard two-alternative variants of conflict tasks, exact stimulus repetitions on 
congruent trials preceded by congruent trials (cC trials) and incongruent trials preceded by 
incongruent trials (iI trials) will speed responding via response priming compared to 
congruent trials preceded by incongruent trials (iC trials) and incongruent trials preceded by 
congruent trials (cI trials), generating a CSE-like pattern (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). 
Furthermore, Hommel, Proctor, & Vu (2004) suggested that even partial stimulus repetitions 
on cI and iC trials can complicate interpretations, as the repeated stimulus feature can activate 
the event file associated with the previous trial (i.e., a representation that contains both 
stimulus and response characteristics). As this outdated event file then needs to be 
overwritten, performance is slowed on these trials, once again resulting in a CSE-like pattern.  
Increasing the number of stimulus features and responses used in the task from two to 
four can solve the feature repetition problem because complete and partial stimulus 
repetitions can be removed from analyses or avoided altogether. However, this solution 
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introduces a new confound (Mordkoff, 2012; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011). In a 4-
alternative task, a 50% congruent trial sequence is typically generated by inflating the number 
of congruent trials compared to what would be expected if stimulus features were combined 
randomly. For example, to maintain 50% congruence in a four-arrow flanker task, a right-
ward central arrow would have to be paired with right-ward distractors three times as often as 
with left-, up-, or down-ward arrows. This, would mean that a right-ward distractor is paired 
more often with a right-ward response than with any other response; in other words, a 
contingency would exist between the distractor and the congruent response. This would result 
in the supposedly task-irrelevant dimension becoming informative. Importantly, Schmidt, 
Crump, Cheesman, & Besner (2007) found that not only do individuals respond faster to 
high-contingency trials compared to low-contingency trials in a non-conflict task, the size of 
this contingency effect is also modulated by previous trial contingency. Since contingency is 
perfectly confounded with congruency in 4-alternative 50% congruent trial sequences, this 
sequential contingency modulation can account for the CSE-pattern as well. Therefore, it is 
important to control for the effects of stimulus repetitions and contingency learning if one 
wants to interpret the CSE in terms of control adjustments.  Notably, recent studies have 
found the CSE pattern even after removing feature repetitions and target-distracter 
contingencies from the trial sequence, lending credence to the view that the CSE can occur in 
the absence of learning and memory confounds, presumably as a function of control 
adjustments (e.g., Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2017; Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & 
Notebaert, 2014b; Schmidt & Weissman, 2014; Weissman, Colter, Drake, & Morgan, 2015).  
Developmental studies of the CSE in children found that 5-7- and 6-8-year-olds 
already show sequential modulation (Ambrosi, Lemaire, & Blaye, 2016; Iani, Stella, & 
Rubichi, 2014) and Larson, Clawson, Clayson, & South (2012) found no difference in the 
size of the CSE between 9 year-old children and 22-year-olds. Smulders, Soetens, & van der 
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Molen (2018) also found no significant age differences between children, preadolescents, and 
a group of late adolescents and young adults (18-25 year-olds) after controlling for baseline 
speed differences between groups. These studies, however, have all contained either feature 
repetition or both feature repetition and contingency learning confounds. Notably, using a 
confound-minimized flanker task, Cragg (2016) also found no age difference in the CSE 
between 7-, 10-, and 20-year-olds, groups that might correspond to children, preadolescents, 
and late adolescents, respectively. Similarly, Waxer & Morton (2011) who used a complex 
modified conflict task with an additional task-switching manipulation, found no difference in 
the size of the CSE between mid-adolescents (14-15-year-olds) and an older group consisting 
of both late adolescents and young adults (18-25). One empirical finding, however, that 
supports the idea that some control-related processes show protracted maturation comes from 
a study by Erb & Marcovitch (2018) who decomposed the CSE into a response threshold 
adjustment process and the controlled, top-down selection of the target response using reach 
tracking, and found that the latter process showed significant gains between preadolescents 
(10-12 year-olds) and a group of both late adolescents and young adults (18-24 year-olds). 
Their task, however, also contained confounds, further underlining the necessity to study 
potential age-related changes in the CSE using confound-minimized paradigms where 
control-related processes are isolated, and appropriate adult comparison groups that do not 
overlap with late adolescence.   
Consequently, this study was designed to investigate changes in dynamic control 
adjustments across adolescence using confound-minimized variants of two commonly used 
conflict tasks, the flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and the Simon task (Simon, 1969), in 
four age groups: early adolescence (12-13-year-olds), mid-adolescence (14-15), late 
adolescence (18-20), and young adulthood (25-27). These two tasks were chosen because a 
recent study (Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2017) concluded that the CSE in these two paradigms 
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likely reflects a cognitive control adjustment mechanism, whereas the CSE found in the 
colour-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) might reflect a priming-related mechanism. 
Based on previous findings (Ambrosi et al., 2016; Cragg, 2016; Iani et al., 2014) we 
expected to find the CSE in every age group. Furthermore, based on models of cognitive 
control development (Shulman et al., 2016) the CSE was predicted to increase in magnitude 
across the age groups, reflecting greater deployment of top-down control in response to 
changing task demands as a function of age, in line with previous studies that interpreted 
larger CSEs in the Simon and flanker tasks as reflecting better control modulation (e.g., 
Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2017). An alternative interpretation of CSE magnitude could be 
that a larger modulation actually means that there is less cognitive control deployed to tackle 
conflict in the first place, leading to incongruence impacting performance to a greater extent, 
therefore smaller CSEs might be an indicator of optimal performance. This would lead to the 
alternative hypothesis that the CSE should decrease across age as control matures. 
Importantly, both interpretations suggest that a) the CSE indexes some control related 
phenomenon, and b) its magnitude should change across age. Challenging the latter 
prediction are previous empirical findings that suggest control adjustment abilities reach 
maturity in late childhood (Cragg, 2016; Larson et al., 2012; Waxer & Morton, 2011). If that 
is the case, we might see no substantial age differences in the CSE at all.  
Mind-wandering, cognitive control, and age 
In addition to the control of attention across age groups, we also investigated lapses in 
attention in our sample, as captured by mind-wandering (MW). We aimed to explore the 
relationships between development and MW, and cognitive control and MW. MW is a 
multidimensional construct that includes a wide variety of subjective experiences (Seli et al., 
2018), and in the present study, was defined as task unrelated thoughts occurring during goal-
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directed activities (e.g., Gyurkovics, Balota, & Jackson, 2017; Jackson & Balota, 2012). 
Flexible cognitive control may be imperative in re-focusing attention to the task once the 
mind has wandered, as such, more flexible modulation of control may be associated with less 
time spent in MW during the task. Based on this notion, Drescher, Van den Bussche, & 
Desender (2018) investigated the relationship between the CSE in a flanker task, and MW 
frequency as captured by performance on the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), a Go/No Go task often used in MW 
research because of its unengaging nature (e.g., Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & 
Schooler, 2009; Gyurkovics et al., 2017; Jackson & Balota, 2012). The authors expected a 
QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK D ³ELJJHU PHDQV EHWWHU FRQWURO GHSOR\PHQW´
interpretation of the CSE. No reliable relationship was found, but numerically the coefficients 
were in accordance with predictions. We examined whether the association between the CSE 
and MW frequency was present in a larger sample using two different conflict tasks and 
generalized linear mixed-effects models to maximize the power of analyses.   
Finally, we investigated age-related differences in MW across adolescence both at the 
state and the trait level. We formulated two competing hypotheses. Theories that consider 
MW to be a consequence of failures of executive control (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2010, 2012) 
would predict that MW decreases in frequency as a function of age as executive abilities 
mature. This is also in line with our previous hypothesis that better control regulation would 
be associated with less MW. However, there is another prominent view of MW which 
considers this type of cognition to be resource dependent (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and 
receives support from aging studies that find that older adults tend to report fewer instances 
of MW during a task (e.g., Giambra, 1989, 2000; Jackson & Balota, 2012; for a recent review 
see Maillet & Schacter, 2016), in everyday life (Maillet et al., 2018), or at the trait level (Seli, 
Maillet, Smilek, Oakman, & Shacter, 2017) than young adults, possibly because cognitive 
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resources decline with age, thus older adults have fewer resources left over to maintain a task 
unrelated train of thought when already engaged in a task. This view would predict that the 
frequency of MW should increase as a function of maturation (and an associated increase in 
resources, e.g., Conklin, Luciana, Hooper, & Yarger, 2007; De Luca et al., 2003; Luna, 
Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004) in our study.  
 To our knowledge, thus far only one study has compared adolescent MW rates with 
adult MW rates to explore developmental changes in MW frequency (Stawarczyk et al., 
2014). Based on their responses to probe questions embedded in the SART, mid-adolescents 
(14-16-year-olds) did not differ from a group of late adolescents and adults (19-26-year-olds) 
in how frequently they experienced MW, defined as task-unrelated thoughts while attention 
was decoupled from the environment, but they did report being distracted by external events 
more frequently during the task than did young adults. Consequently, in the current study, we 
explored whether age-related changes in MW frequency might become apparent if MW 
reports are differentiated based on the associated level of metacognition (i.e., were they aware 
that their mind had wandered before the probe question; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). Furthermore, in this study we also investigated possible 
changes in MW across different stages of adolescence early, mid- and late; and contrasted 
these groups with young adults in their late twenties, above even the most liberal upper limit 
of adolescence (age 24; Shulman et al., 2018).  
Although the main focus of our study was self-reported MW, proposed behavioural 
indices of MW such as Go and No Go accuracy, and reaction time variability to Go trials 
(Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009) were also investigated, both across adolescence 
and with respect to cognitive control. Furthermore, age-related differences in SART 
performance were also examined because of the wealth of previous findings showing that 
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Go/No Go task performance improves with age (Braet et al., 2009; Carriere et al., 2010; 
Rubia et al., 2006; Stawarczyk et al., 2014). 
 
Method 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, 
and all measures in the study. Data files and the analysis script for this study are available on 
the Open Science Framework at the following URL: https://osf.io/7vbtr/ .  
Participants 
Participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited from 4 different age 
groups: 1) early adolescents (n = 30, 10 females, mean age = 12.43, SD = .57, age range: 12-
13, mean pubertal development score (Carskadon & Acebo, 1993): 2.17, SD = .57), 2) mid-
adolescents (n = 25, 16 females, mean age = 14.36, SD = .49, age range: 14-15, mean 
pubertal development score: 3.07, SD = .51), 3) late adolescents (n = 28, 19 females, mean 
age = 18.57, SD = .57, age range: 18-20), and 4) young adults (n = 25, 16 females, mean age 
= 25.76, SD = .78, age range: 25-27). We aimed to collect 30 participants in each age group, 
as previous studies, and a pilot study conducted by the authors (data available on request), 
were able to detect the CSE with a sample of this size, and this number was attainable given 
other, practical constraints as well (time and funding available). Deviations from the target 
number are primarily due to the removal of some participants due to neurological or 
psychiatric problems undisclosed during recruitment. Participants were recruited through 
VRFLDOPHGLDYLDDYROXQWHHUV¶GDWDEDVHPDLQWDLQHGE\WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI6KHIILHOGDQGIURP
amongst the undergraduate and postgraduate students of the same University. Every 
volunteer received £10 as compensation for their time taking part. The study was approved 
by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield.  
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Materials 
Conflict tasks 
Participants completed two conflict tasks: the flanker task and the Simon task. In the flanker 
task, participants had to identify the direction the central target arrow was pointing in (left, 
right, up, or down) out of a string of 5 arrows displayed in the centre of the screen. On 
congruent trials, the arrows all pointed in the same direction, while on incongruent trials the 
target arrow in the middle pointed in a different direction from the other four, flanking 
arrows. In the Simon task, participants only saw a single arrow on each trial, and had to 
identify which direction it was pointing in, regardless of the location it was presented in. 
Arrows could be presented either above, below, to the left of, or to the right of fixation. On 
congruent trials the location and the direction of the arrow matched (e.g., an upward pointing 
arrow above fixation), whereas on incongruent trials they were the opposite (e.g., a 
downward pointing arrow below fixation).    
Both tasks started with 24 practice trials which were extended with an additional 12 
trials if the participant did not give at least 19 correct responses on the first 24 trials. 
Feedback was given after every trial during the practice session. Experimental sessions 
consisted of 3 blocks of 97 trials separated by short self-paced breaks, resulting in a total of 
291 trials for both tasks. In each block, there were 24 trials in each condition (cC, iC, iI, cI). 
The first trial in each block had no previous congruency, and was not included in CSE 
analyses. The congruency of the first trial was determined randomly for each block.  
The following measures were taken to control for both feature integration and 
contingency confounds: the four stimulus values (left, right, up, down) were divided into two 
pairs. In the flanker tasks, this was done randomly (any direction could be paired with any 
other), while in the Simon task, right was always paired with left, and up was always paired 
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with down. Only values from one pair were used on odd trials, and values from the other pair 
on even trials to create the target (e.g., if right (R) was paired with up (U), and left (L) with 
down (D) in the flanker, incongruent trials could be RRURR or UURUU on odd/even trials, 
and LLDLL or DDLDD on even/odd trials, but never RRDRR, LLULL, etc.). In other words, 
the trial sequence was alternating between two two-value variants of the same task. This 
guaranteed that no features were repeated, and ensured that the irrelevant stimulus feature 
was not disproportionately predictive of the correct answer. This method has been used in 
previous studies to control for these two confounds (Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2017; Jimenez 
& Mendez, 2013; Kim & Cho, 2014; Schmidt & Weissman, 2014; Weissman, Jiang, & 
Egner, 2014).   
Following the design used by Aschenbrenner & Balota (2017), the following 
sequence of events occurred on each trial, in both tasks: a fixation cross was displayed for 
500 ms, followed by a blank screen for 200 ms. After this, the target stimulus was presented 
for 3000 ms, or until a response was made. Participants had to indicate the direction of the 
target arrows by pressing the 2, 4, 6, or 8 keys on the numeric keypad to respond down, left, 
right, or up, respectively. Participants were asked to use the index finger of their dominant 
hand. Following the target stimulus, a blank screen was presented for 1000 ms if the response 
to the target was correct. On incorrect trials an error message was displayed for 1000 ms 
LQVWHDGRIWKHEODQNVFUHHQVD\LQJHLWKHUµ(5525¶LIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWSUHVVHGDQLQFRUUHFWNH\
RUµ7226/2:¶LIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWIDLOHGWRUHVSRQd within the response deadline. Finally, the 
PHVVDJH³3UHVVWRFRQWLQXH´DSSHDUHGRQVFUHHQXQWLOWKHSDUWLFLSDQWSUHVVHGWKHNH\RQ
WKHQXPEHUSDGDQGVWDUWHGWKHQH[WWULDO7KLVZDVGRQHWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VLQGH[
finger was equal distances away from all four response buttons. 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) with thought probes 
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In the SART (developed by Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), the task 
of the participants was to press the SPACE bar every time a digit between 1 and 9 appeared 
on screen, except if that number was 3. In other words, digits 1, 2, and 4 to 9 were identified 
as Go stimuli, and the number 3 was identified as the No Go stimulus. With the exception of 
number identity, Go and No Go trials were identical. There were two blocks of 131 trials, 
resulting in a total of 262 trials. The two blocks were separated by a short self-paced break. 
Out of the 262 trials, 224 (85.5%) were Go trials, and 28 (10.69%) were No Go trials. On the 
remaining 10 trials (3.82%) instead of a digit, participants saw the following probe question 
until they responded ³3OHDVH FKRRVH WKH RQH RSWLRQ EHORZ WKDW EHVW GHVFULEHV \RXU
experience with the WDVN MXVWQRZ´ VHH*\XUNRYLFV HW DO, 2017; Jackson & Balota, 2012). 
The oSWLRQVZHUH³,ZDVWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHWDVN´³0\PLQGZDVEODQN´³0\PLQGGULIWHG
WRWKLQJVRWKHUWKDQWKHWDVNEXW,ZDVQ¶WDZDUHRILWXQWLO\RXDVNHGPH´DQG³:KLOHGRLQJ
WKHWDVN,ZDVDZDUHWKDWWKRXJKWVDERXWRWKHUWKLQJVSRSSHGLQWRP\KHDG´FRrresponding to 
on-task thoughts, space outs, zone outs, and tune outs respectively (Smallwood et al., 2007). 
Trials were intermixed pseudo-randomly, so that targets (No Go trials) were never preceded 
or immediately followed by another target or a probe. Proportions of different trial types were 
identical across the two blocks. On digit trials (Go or No Go trials), a digit in white was 
presented on black background in the centre of the screen for 1250 ms. The stimulus was then 
followed by an intertrial interval of 1250 ms, during which a blank black screen was 
presented. No performance feedback was provided during the experimental blocks. The two 
experimental blocks were preceded by three practice blocks. In the first, participants 
completed 9 trials (1 target), and received feedback on their performance after each one. In 
the second one, participants similarly completed 9 trials with feedback, however, this time a 
probe question was also added. In the final practice block, 9 trials and a probe appeared, with 
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no feedback. As such, this practice block was identical to the experimental blocks. All tasks 
were programmed using the Psychtoolbox extension in MATLAB R2014b. 
Procedure 
After obtaining informed consent from participants and their parents in the case of 
participants who were under 18, they first completed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) for the first time (PANAS1) to 
measure their baseline emotional state prior to the start of the session. Then the experimenter 
administered the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Psychological 
Corporation, 1999). This took approximately 15-20 minutes. After this, the participant was 
seated at a computer, and the two conflict tasks (the flanker and the Simon tasks) were 
completed. Their order was counterbalanced across participants. The two tasks together took 
approximately 30-40 minutes to complete. As the next step, the PANAS was completed for 
the second time (PANAS2), followed by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, 1989), and the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ; Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 
2013) that measures the everyday frequency of deliberate and spontaneous MW. Early and 
mid-adolescents also completed a self-rated measure of pubertal development (Carskadon & 
Acebo, 1993). Finally, the SART was run, which lasted approximately 10-15 minutes. 
Altogether one experimental session lasted about 75-90 minutes. Descriptive data for the 
individual difference measures can be found in Supplementary Table 1. With the exception of 
the MWQ individual difference measures were collected as part of standard practice in our 
lab to enable better characterization of each age group but no hypotheses were formulated 
regarding these variables and their association with cognitive control. 
Statistical Analysis 
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Before statistical analyses, RTs shorter than 150 ms were removed. This resulted in the 
removal of only 0.05% of trials in the flanker, 0.08% of trials in the Simon, and 1.60% of 
trials that had RTs in the SART. Then outliers, identified as trials with RTs beyond 3 SDs of 
WKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VPHDQZHUHDOVRUHPRYHG. This resulted in the removal of 1.55%, 1.69%, and 
1.44% of trials in the flanker, Simon, and SART, respectively. For RT analyses in the conflict 
tasks, error trials and trials immediately following error trials were also removed. For 
accuracy analyses, these trials were retained. 
Age effects in behavioural performance on the tasks were investigated with linear 
mixed-effects modelling using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015). For the flanker and the Simon tasks, predictors Current Trial Congruency (coded as 0 
and 1 for congruent and incongruent, respectively), Previous Trial Congruency (coded as 0 
and 1 for congruent and incongruent, respectively), Age Group (with young adults serving as 
reference category), and all their interactions were specified as fixed effects, with reaction 
time as an outcome variable, and a random effect of participants. The random effects 
structure was determined by examining the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values of 
models containing no random slopes, only random intercepts per participant; random slopes 
for Current Congruency, and random slopes for the Current Congruency × Previous 
Congruency interaction. The model with the lowest AIC value was selected. The Type II 
ANOVA table of the final model generated by the Anova() function is reported. P-values for 
FRHIILFLHQWV ZLWKLQ WKH PRGHO ZHUH VXSSOLHG E\ WKH ³OPHU7HVW´ 5 SDFNDJH XVLQJ WKH
Satterthwaite approximation to estimate degrees of freedom (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2016). Follow-up pairwise analyses for interactions containing group were 
conducted using the ³HPPHDQV´ R package (Lenth, 2018). For accuracy analyses similar 
generalized linear mixed-effects models were run. For the sake of brevity, accuracy analyses 
are only reported if they in any way contradict or complement RT findings. Descriptive 
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accuracy data is presented in Supplementary Table 2. Furthermore, the code for 
supplementary models containing different control variables that may affect findings (e.g., 
baseline mood, IQ, or sex) LVDYDLODEOHRQWKHSURMHFW¶V26)page at https://osf.io/7vbtr/. 
Accuracy and reaction time data from the SART was analysed using a strategy 
identical to the one outlined above, with the exception that the variables included in these 
models were Trial Type (Go or No Go, coded as 0 and 1 respectively) and Age Group. 
Reaction time variability changes as a function of age were investigated with a between-
subject ANOVA. The outcome variable was the Go stimulus coefficient of variation (CV; Go 
RT SD / mean Go RT).  
To investigate the relationship between self-reported MW and cognitive control (i.e., 
the size of the CSE), generalized linear mixed-effects models were used. In these analyses, 
binary dummy variables indicating whether a given thought report category was chosen in 
response to a probe question or not were the outcome variables. The magnitude of the CSE 
for each participant was calculated using the formula (cI ± cC) ± (iC ± iI) where each letter 
combination corresponds to the mean RT of that condition. Random intercepts per 
participants were specified to account for multiple observations (i.e., probe questions) by 
individual. This strategy is similar to the one used by Van den Driessche et al. (2017). This 
same strategy was used to analyse group differences in MW frequency. Generalized linear 
mixed-effects models were also used to examine the relationship between SART accuracy ± a 
proposed behavioural indicator of MW - and cognitive control. The results of the Anova() 
function are reported, along with exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios, ORs) where 
appropriate. Pearson correlations were used to investigate whether cognitive control and 
behavioural variability (Go trial CV) are related. Finally, Kendall rank correlation was used 
to investigate the relationships between SART accuracy and self-reported MW, and 
behavioural variability and self-reported MW. 
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7KHĮOHYHOZDVVHWDWLQDOODQDO\VHV    
Results 
Conflict tasks 
Reaction time analyses 
Raw reaction times were analysed first (for means and SDs, see Supplementary Table 3). 
Table 1 contains the relevant terms of the various models run. In the flanker task, a model 
with random slopes for the Previous Congruency × Current Congruency interaction was 
selected over a model with only random intercepts, and a model with random slopes for the 
effect of Current Congruency only. A main effect of Congruency was found, indicating 
slower responses on incongruent compared to congruent trials. This was modulated by 
Previous Congruency, in other words, a reliable CSE was found. However, the CSE by Age 
Group interaction did not approach significance. Figure 1 shows the CSE by age groups. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
In the Simon task, similarly to the flanker, the model with random slopes for the 
Previous Congruency × Current Congruency interaction was preferred, as opposed to the 
model with only random intercepts, or the model with random slopes for the effect of Current 
Congruency only. A significant Congruency effect and a CSE were found in this task too. 
The CSE was not significantly modified by Age.  
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INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The same pattern of results emerged for the terms of interest after controlling for 
baseline speed differences across groups by standardizing reaction times on each participant¶V 
mean and SD (for descriptive data, see Supplementary Table 3). As can be seen in Table 1, 
the Age Group × Current Congruency interaction was significant in these analyses in both 
tasks. Early adolescents showed smaller congruency effects than late adolescents and adults 
in both tasks (all ps < .05). Mid-adolescents also differed from the two older groups in the 
flanker task. 
Exploratory analyses 
We conducted additional cross-task analyses, examining the two conflict tasks together. 
These analyses were run to explore whether the CSE interacts with Task, and whether the 
CSE by Age Group interaction interacts with Task. A significant Previous Congruency × 
Current Congruency × Task interaction was found, both in raw and standardized RT, Ȥ²(1) = 
12.19, p < .001, and Ȥ²(1) = 17.33, p < .001, respectively, reflecting the fact that the CSE was 
bigger in the Simon compared to the flanker task. The Previous Congruency × Current 
Congruency × Task × Age Group interaction did not reach significance. 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART)  
Behavioural performance 
Indices of behavioural performance on the SART are summarized in Table 2. For RT 
analyses, the model with random slopes for Trial Type per participant was preferred over a 
model that only contained random intercepts (AIC values: 299341.3 and 299364.4, 
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respectively). The main effects of Trial Type and Age Group were significant, Ȥ²(1) = 183.90, 
p < .001, and Ȥ²(3) = 45.75, p < .001, respectively. Participants were faster on incorrect No 
Go trials than on correct Go trials, and early adolescents were generally slower than any other 
group (all ps < .01). When standardized RTs were examined to control for the baseline speed 
difference across groups, only the random intercepts model converged. Trial Type still had a 
main effect, Ȥ²(1) = 208.63, p < .001, but neither of the other effects approached significance.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
When accuracy was analysed, main effects of Trial Type and Age Group were found, 
OR = .012, 95% CI [.006, .024], Ȥ²(1) = 552.09, p < .001, and Ȥ²(3) = 17.97, p < .001, 
respectively. As would be expected, participants were more error-prone on No Go trials than 
on Go trials, and early adolescents were more error-prone than late adolescents or adults (all 
ps < .05). The Trial Type × Age Group interaction was significant in this analysis, Ȥ²(3) = 
10.07, p = .018, with a bigger difference between the two conditions in early adolescents 
compared to young adults (p = .011).   
To examine RT variability, the coefficient of variation (CV) was calculated for each 
participant (correct Go trial RT SD / correct Go trial RT mean). This was significantly 
different across groups, F(3, 102) = 8.60, p < .001. The CV in early and mid-adolescents was 
significantly different from late adolescents and adults (all ps < .05), suggesting that intra-
individual variability in RT on correct Go trials was higher in the two under-18 compared to 
the over-18 age groups. 
Mind-wandering and age 
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First, we investigated age differences in self-reported MW frequency during the SART 
(Table 3). The frequency of each thought content category across groups is illustrated in 
Figure 3. A significant difference was found in the probability of reporting tune outs (MW 
with awareness) across age groups. Post-hoc tests suggested this was due to early adolescents 
reporting fewer tune outs than late adolescents, OR = .375, 95% CI [0.158, 0.888], z = -2.92, 
Tukey adjusted p = .018. No reliable age effects were found in the other thought content 
categories. To explore the data further, MW with and without awareness were collapsed into 
a new category, ³overall MW´. There was an age effect in this category too (Table 3, bottom 
row), which closely mirrored the pattern of the age effect in tune outs: early adolescents 
reported MW less frequently than late adolescents, OR = .406, 95% CI [0.181, 0.910], z = -
2.87, Tukey adjusted p = .022. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
  
Next, we analysed self-reported trait MW, as measured by the two subscales, 
Deliberate and Spontaneous, of the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire. In a 2 (MW Type: 
Deliberate, Spontaneous) × 4 (Age Group) ANOVA, a main effect of Group was found, 
F(3,102) = 5.09, p = .003. This was due to early adolescents reporting less MW 
(MeanDeliberate: 3.91 ± 1.11; MeanSpontaneous: 3.35 ± 1.37) than late adolescents (MeanD: 4.94 ± 
1.22; MeanSp: 4.63 ± 1.22) and young adults (MeanD: 4.79 ± 1.43; MeanSp: 4.36 ± 1.39, all ps 
< .05). Mid-adolescents did not significantly differ from any other group (MeanD: 4.72 ± 
1.30; MeanSp: 4.06 ± 1.54). Participants in every age group reported less spontaneous MW 
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than deliberate, F(1,102) = 21.71, p < .001. The MW Type × Age Group interaction did not 
approach significance (F < 1).  
Neither of the potential, performance based behavioural indices of MW (Go accuracy, 
No Go accuracy, Go RT CV in the SART) were significantly related to self-reports of MW, 
either state or trait level. The two levels of self-reports, however, were correlated in our 
sample: both deliberate and spontaneous trait-MW predicted the probability of on task 
reports, OR = .687, 95% CI [.562, .831], Ȥ²(1) = 14.93, p < .001, and OR = .708, 95% CI 
[.593, .839], Ȥ²(1) = 15.88, p < .001, respectively; and tune out reports during the task, OR = 
1.426, 95% CI [1.186, 1.733], Ȥ²(1) = 14.13, p < .001, and OR = 1.299, 95% CI [1.093, 
1.560], Ȥ²(1) = 8.77, p = .003, respectively.   
Mind-wandering and cognitive control 
We next examined whether the magnitude of the CSE was related to the self-reported 
frequency of MW during the SART (Table 3). The frequency of MW with awareness (tune 
outs) was negatively related to the magnitude of the CSE in the flanker in both raw and 
standardized RT, OR = .986, 95% CI [.975, .996], and OR = .236, 95% CI [.069, .775], 
respectively. Similar associations were found using overall MW as the outcome in both raw 
and standardized RT: OR = .986, 95% CI [.976, .995], and OR = .296, 95% CI [.093, .915], 
respectively. A positive relationship of similar magnitude was also found between raw RT 
CSE in the flanker and on-task thought report frequency, OR = 1.015, 95% CI [1.004, 1.026]. 
These relationships did not interact with age. No significant relationships were found in the 
Simon task or with other thought report categories. The magnitude of the CSE was also not a 
significant predictor of any of the potential behavioural indices of MW (Go accuracy, No Go 
accuracy, Go RT CV; all ps > .05), and was not related to trait MW (all ps > .05).    
Discussion 
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In the present study, we investigated different aspects of the cognitive control system across 
early, mid- and late adolescence, and young adulthood. Confound-minimized versions of two 
classic conflict tasks, the Simon task and the flanker task, were used to examine whether 
adolescents show evidence of dynamic modulations of cognitive control as indicated by the 
presence of the congruency sequence effect (CSE), and whether the magnitude of this 
modulation changes across adolescence. Furthermore, we also investigated self-reported 
mind-wandering (MW) in a Go/No Go task in these age groups, and the relationship between 
MW and cognitive control. 
Cognitive control across adolescence 
The main focus of this study was to investigate age-related changes in dynamic adjustments 
of cognitive control as indexed by the CSE. The typical CSE pattern in reaction time was 
observed in both tasks and was larger in the Simon compared to the flanker task, replicating 
an effect reported by Weissman et al. (2015; Weissman, Jiang, & Egner, 2014). The authors 
suggested that this difference might be because distractor information is translated into a 
response more rapidly than target information in the Simon task compared to the flanker task, 
JLYLQJD ³KHDG VWDUW´ IRU WKH LQKLELWLRQRI the distractor-related response. This inhibition is 
then further amplified after incongruent trials, generating a larger CSE. Our results support 
this account. 
Contrary to our prediction, age did not interact with the CSE in either one of the tasks. 
This is consistent with previous developmental work involving children (Cragg, 2016; Larson 
et al., 2012; Waxer & Morton, 2011), that also found no significant age differences in the size 
of the CSE across different age groups. Numerically, the CSE increased slightly across age 
groups in the flanker task, and decreased in the Simon task. Such a divergence, coupled with 
the fact that there was no correlation in the CSE across tasks (r = - .10 in raw RT, r = - .05 in 
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standardized RT) could hint at a difference between the mechanisms, or in the 
implementation of the same mechanism, underlying the CSE in the two tasks.  This is in line 
with recent findings that suggest that conflict signals and/or control mechanisms are specific 
to a given task (Funes, Lupianez, & Humphreys, 2010; Whitehead, Brewer, & Blais, 2018, 
for a review see Braem, Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2014), or even that the 
mechanism generating the CSE might differ from task to task (Aschenbrenner & Balota, 
2015, 2017). 
Similar to the CSE and consistent with some previous studies (Adleman et al., 2002; 
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2011; Veroude et al., 2013), the congruency effect observed in this 
study did not differ between age groups when examining raw RT scores. However, when 
baseline speed differences between groups were controlled for in the analyses, participants 
under 18 (early and mid-adolescents) showed smaller congruency effects compared to both 
over-18 groups. This was most likely an effect of the standardization procedure as 
adolescents showed higher intra-individual variability in accordance with previous studies 
showing that adolescent performance is more variable than adult performance (Montez, 
Calabro, & Luna, 2017). Hence, when RTs were standardized based on SDs, the effect 
appeared to be smaller compared to the high intra-individual variance in that group than in 
the less variable adult group.   
Taken together, our findings suggest that on the behavioural level conflict resolution, 
as measured by the congruency effect, matures quickly and reaches adult-like levels by or 
before the age of 12. Similarly, patterns typically associated with conflict-induced dynamic 
adjustments of control levels are already present at the same age. This is in line with the 
conclusions of Ambrosi et al. (2016), Cragg (2016), Iani et al. (2014), and Stins, Polderman, 
Boomsma, & de Geus (2007) who tested children at or under the age of 12. Sequential 
modulations did not show substantial changes as a function of age in our sample in 
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accordance with previous studies using confounded or more complex paradigms (Larson et 
al., 2012; Smulders et al., 2018; Waxer & Morton, 2011). Our results complement those of 
Cragg (2016) who used a confound-free flanker task in children and late adolescents, by 
showing a similar lack of substantial age differences in a confound-free Simon task between 
adolescents and adults. It is, however, important to bear in mind that we cannot draw the 
conclusion that there are no age effects in the CSE from null findings as our study and 
previous studies may simply have been underpowered to detect them. If so, our findings 
suggest that any age-related changes in CSE magnitude are likely to be extremely subtle, 
especially after controlling for age differences in response speed. 
Go/No Go performance and Mind Wandering  
Patterns consistent with age-related improvements in cognitive control were found in the 
SART, both in behavioural performance and self-reported MW with the biggest differences 
emerging between participants under and over 18. Early adolescents were slower and more 
error prone than the other groups. Furthermore, the performance of early and mid-adolescents 
on Go trials was more variable compared to the two older groups. This pattern of results is 
consistent with previous findings that adolescents show impaired performance in Go/No Go 
tasks both in terms of speed and accuracy (Carriere et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2014) and 
behavioural variability (Braet et al., 2009; Stawarcyzk et al., 2014). These findings are also in 
line with models of adolescent cognitive development that posit that control abilities are still 
maturing at this stage of life (Iselin & DeCoster, 2009; Shulman et al., 2016). According to 
our results, however, this improvement is more evident in certain abilities than in others, as 
the inhibition of prepotent but momentarily incorrect responses in the SART did show age-
related changes while conflict resolution and adaptation to conflict in the flanker and the 
Simon tasks did not.   
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 Turning to mind-wandering, age differences were also found in the reported 
frequencies of MW during the SART. Early adolescents reported significantly fewer episodes 
of overall MW (MW episodes with or without awareness, combined) than late adolescents, 
and numerically fewer episodes than adults. One explanation of this observation could be that 
MW, or certain aspects of MW (e.g., the maintenance of off-task thought), are resource-
dependent (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2013) and early adolescents just do 
not have enough cognitive resources at their disposal yet to generate and/or maintain off-task 
thoughts during task performance. Our finding that late adolescents reported the highest 
levels of MW, however, could also be explained in terms of the ³control failures × current 
concerns´ account of MW (McVay & Kane, 2010). This posits that MW is a consequence of 
WKHFRJQLWLYHV\VWHP¶VIDLOXUHWRGHIHQGWDVNSHUIRUPDQFHIURPWKHLQWHUIHUHQFHRILQWUXVLYH
thoughts, triggered by the current concerns of an individual. It is possible, although 
speculative, that late adolescents who were primarily undergraduate students had more 
university related current concerns that were activated by the university setting in which they 
were tested than any other group, leading to a disproportional increase in MW in that specific 
age group. Furthermore, as this age effect was driven by differences in the frequency of MW 
episodes with awareness, it could be due to differences in metacognitive ability across the 
groups (Weil et al., 2013), as opposed to differences in the actual amount or duration of MW 
episodes. Future studies are needed to replicate these findings and to disentangle potential 
mechanisms 
Our results complement the findings of Stawarczyk et al. (2014) who found no 
difference in self-reported MW frequency between 14-16 and 19-26 year-olds. Importantly, 
that study did not distinguish between different types of MW and used broader age ranges, 
both of which factors might have contributed to the lack of age-related differences in MW. 
They did, however, find that their adolescent group were on-task less frequently than adults, 
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unlike in our sample. This is seemingly at odds with the cognitive resource account of MW, 
however their findings suggested that this effect was a result of an increase in external 
distractions (not measured in our study), and not in spontaneous thoughts in adolescents. This 
is consistent with the idea that adolescents have less developed attention regulation abilities 
(e.g., Polizzotto, Hill-Jarrett, Walker, & Cho, 2018).     
We also investigated trait level MW using a brief mind-wandering questionnaire 
developed by Carriere et al. (2013). This questionnaire measures the frequency of MW 
episodes engaged deliberately (intentional MW) and spontaneously (unintentional MW) in 
everyday life. This is an important distinction, as the two types of MW can show dissociation 
(Golchert et al., 2017; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015; Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016) and the 
intentionality dimension has also been shown to be different from the meta-awareness 
dimension (Seli, Ralph, Risko, Schooler, Shacter, & Smilek, 2017). In our sample, both 
intentional and unintentional trait-level MW was positively correlated with MW with 
awareness during the SART, but not with MW without awareness. This pattern of results 
provides further indirect support for the idea that intentionality and meta-awareness are not 
identical constructs. However, it is worth noting that MW without awareness was reported 
very infrequently in our sample, and low variability in its incidence may have limited our 
ability to detect meaningful associations involving this type of MW. Finally, both deliberate 
and spontaneous MW were found to increase with age, paralleling our state-level results, and 
the findings of Seli, Maillet et al. (2017) in older adults (Exp. 1).  
Cognitive control and MW 
We also investigated the possible relationship between mind-wandering and cognitive control 
adjustments, as indicated by the CSE. Across all age groups, we found a reliable negative 
relationship between the size of the CSE in the flanker task and the frequency of overall MW 
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during the SART which was driven by tune outs, similarly to the age effect described above. 
This finding suggests that participants who were better at dynamically adjusting their 
attention to the demands of the task reported fewer task-unrelated thoughts. This is consistent 
with the findings reported by Drescher et al. (2018), and might reflect that these individuals 
show better reactive control of their attention, e.g., they may be better able to redirect their 
attention to the task after it has wandered away, possibly resulting in shorter MW episodes. In 
support of this interpretation, Stawarczyk et al. (2014) also found that reactive control was 
negatively associated with MW frequency.  
The negative relationship between CSE magnitude and MW frequency is seemingly 
inconsistent with our previous conclusion that people with more mature cognitive resources 
MW more. However, previous findings suggest that CSE magnitude is largely independent of 
cognitive resources (e.g., working memory capacity, Meier & Kane, 2013; Unsworth, Redick, 
Spillers, & Brewer, 2012), thus the CSE-MW relationship is probably tapping a different 
aspect of the cognitive system (such as reactive control efficiency) than the MW-age 
relationship (amount of cognitive resources available). 
There are two caveats that make the interpretation of the CSE-MW relationship less 
straightforward. First, as mentioned in the introduction, an argument could be made that if the 
level of proactive, preparatory control is high, adjustments in response to conflict should be 
smaller, thus smaller CSEs might reflect better control allocation. Our developmental 
ILQGLQJVGRQRWKHOSDGMXGLFDWHEHWZHHQWKLVDQGD³ODUJHULVEHWWHU´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDVyoung 
adult CSEs did not differ in size substantially from younger CSEs that are probably generated 
by less mature cognitive systems. However, if we assume that smaller CSEs reflect better 
control, the negative relationship between CSE and MW becomes harder to interpret. It is 
DOVRSRVVLEOHWKDWERWKWKH³ODUJHULVEHWWHU´DQG³VPDOOHULVEHWWHU´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKH&6(
could be viable depending on the approach a given participant takes to the task, and this 
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approach might be fluctuating within an individual too, over the course of the task. These 
limitations must be taken into account in any individual difference study focusing on the 
CSE.  Second, even though we controlled for learning and memory confounds in our design, 
it is still possible that the CSE reflected some non-control related process, such as temporal 
learning (Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt & Weissman, 2016), and that this process is related to MW 
frequency or duration in some way. Further complicating this is the finding that this 
association was only found for the flanker task, and not for the Simon. This observation 
provides additional support to the idea outlined above that the CSE reflects different 
mechanisms in these two tasks as they have different correlates. How exactly the CSE differs 
between the Simon and the flanker tasks and what exactly it reflects in each, however, can 
only be determined through further investigation. for instance, the proportion of reactive vs. 
proactive elements, or the additional contribution of non-control related processes in the CSE 
might be different in the two tasks. 
The results from the current study need to be considered in light of the following 
limitations. First, due to practical reasons, the study did not include any measures of working 
memory capacity. In future studies, such measures could help explore how working memory 
changes across adolescence, and whether these changes are related to attentional control 
adjustments and reports of MW. Furthermore, although the order of the conflict tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants, the SART always came last, thus it is possible that the 
more pronounced age effects in that task are due to greater fatigue effects in younger 
participants compared to adult participants. This, however, does not substantially change our 
interpretation of the MW age effect finding in terms of the cognitive resource account of 
MW. Finally, future studies might benefit from including secondary measures of MW (such 
as eye-tracking and pupillometry) to help establish the validity of self-reports (e.g., Frank, 
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Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015) as it is possible that participants ± especially from 
younger age groups ± were unable to report their thought contents accurately in our study.   
Conclusion 
We investigated how the sequential modulation of the congruency effect changes across 
adolescence in two, confound-minimized conflict tasks. The CSE did not interact with age in 
either of the tasks, strongly suggesting that if there are any age-related changes in the size of 
the effect, they are not substantial. More pronounced age effects were found in response 
inhibition performance in the SART (performance improved with age) and self-reports of 
MW (reports of MW increased with age and peaked in late adolescence). Differences were 
biggest between participants under 18 (early and mid-adolescents) and participants 18 or 
older (late adolescents and young adults). Both findings imply that certain aspects of the 
cognitive system are still maturing in adolescence. Finally, our results that the CSE in the 
flanker task, but not in the Simon task was associated with MW frequency during the SART, 
and that there was no relationship between the CSEs in the two tasks suggest that the CSE 
may not reflect the same mechanism (i.e., conflict-induced control adjustments, temporal 
learning) in the flanker and Simon tasks. 
Context 
The current study was conducted by Mate Gyurkovics as part of his doctoral program. The 
work was supervised by co-DXWKRUV 'UV /LDW /HYLWD DQG 7RP 6WDIIRUG 'U /HYLWD¶V ODE
focuses on the investigation of cognitive and affective changes in adolescence using 
EHKDYLRXUDO DQG HOHFWURSK\VLRORJLFDO PHWKRGV :LWKLQ WKLV SURJUDP RI UHVHDUFK 0DWH¶V
dissertation studies seek to learn more about the development of the cognitive control system, 
response inhibition in particular, across adolescence on both the behavioural and the neural 
level. As a next step, the authors are currently working on an EEG study based on the 
 31 
findings of the present experiment aiming to see if the neural mechanisms supporting 
performance in a similar conflict task are comparable across age groups. In the future, they 
would like to follow up on the implications these findings have for the nature of the CSE in 
different tasks, in order to understand what exactly the age-related changes (or lack thereof) 
in this particular effect tell us about the development of human cognition.   
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Figure 1: The effect of congruency as a function of previous trial congruency, or the 
congruency sequence effect in raw RT in the flanker task. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE. 
 
  
 46 
 
Figure 2 ± The effect of congruency as a function of previous trial congruency, or the 
congruency sequence effect in raw RT in the Simon task. Error bars represent +/- 1 SE. 
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Figure 3 - Box-plots of the frequencies of different categories of thought reports across age 
groups during the SART.  
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Table 1- Terms of interest from the four general linear mixed-effects models investigating the conflict task performance across age groups 
Model 
(AIC value) 
Flanker ± raw RT 
(373188.6) 
Flanker ± z-scored RT 
(82204.5) 
Simon ± raw RT 
(377831.5) 
Simon ± z-scored RT 
(78557.6) 
Effect Ȥð df p Ȥð df p Ȥð df p Ȥð df p 
Age Group 33.52 3 < .001 0.40 3 .940 38.93 3 < .001 0.15 3 .985 
Congruency (C) 314.52 1 < .001 572.26 1 < .001 588.52 1 < .001 1130.92 1 < .001 
Previous Congruency (PC) 2.57 1 .109 8.98 1 .003 14.36 1 < .001 10.56 1 .001 
C × Age Group 6.33 3 .096 20.28 3 < .001 2.24 3 .524 14.50 3 .002 
PC × Age Group 0.21 3 .975 1.04 3 .792 6.94 3 .074 6.00 3 .112 
PC × C (CSE) 13.19 1 < .001 17.25 1 < .001 62.92 1 < .001 105.39 1 < .001 
PC × C × Age Group 1.55 3 .671 4.57 3 .206 7.54 3 .057 4.79 3 .188 
 
Note: CSE = congruency sequence effect. For raw RT analyses, models with random slopes for the PC × C interaction were selected over models 
with a slope only for C, or no random slopes at all. The AIC values of the competing models in the flanker were: 373209.4 for C slope model, and 
373525.9 for no slope model. In the Simon: 377837.7 for C slope model, and 378317.3 for no slope model. For zRT analyses, the C slope models 
 49 
were favoured. The AIC value of competing models in the flanker: 82214.5 for PC × C slope model (failed to converge), and 82394.6 for no slope 
model. In the Simon: 78562.6 for PC × C slope model (failed to converge), and 78777.8 for no slope model.    
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Table 2 - SART task performance indices ± means (SDs) ± for early, mid-, and late adolescents and young adults  
 
 
    
  Early adolescents Mid-adolescents Late adolescents  Young adults 
Accuracy      
 N 30 24 28 24 
 Go accuracy .98 (.02) .99 (.02) .99 (.01) .99 (.01) 
 No-Go accuracy .70 (.19) .72 (.18) .78 (.15) .82 (.15) 
Go Reaction Time    
  
 N 30 24 28 24 
 Go RT 552.34 (81.90) 473.24 (64.95) 442.67 (87.24) 425.85 (51.96) 
 Go Zrt .02 (.01) .02 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
No-Go Reaction 
Time    
  
 N 29 24 27 24 
 No-Go RT 438.20 (82.10) 380.83 (71.50) 363.81 (51.73) 349.51 (58.34) 
 No-Go zRT -.62 (.37) -.65 (.39) -.59 (.35) - .69 (.48) 
Intraindividual 
variability    
  
 N 30 24 28 24 
 Go RT CV .31 (.06) .30 (.06) .26 (.06) .25 (.04) 
 
Note: Accuracy reflects the proportion of correct responses. CV = coefficient of variation (Go RT SD / Go RT mean). 
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Table 3 - Terms from the generalized linear mixed-effects models investigating the frequency of different thought content reports across age and 
as a function of CSE magnitude in the two tasks. 
 
 
 Age 
Flanker CSE 
(RT) 
Flanker CSE 
(zRT) 
Simon CSE 
(RT) 
Simon CSE 
(zRT) 
 
Ȥð3) p Ȥð p Ȥð p Ȥð p Ȥð p 
On-task Reports 6.92 0.074 7.53 0.006* 3.39 0.066 0.39 0.535 < .01 0.964 
Space Outs 6.59 0.086 0.07 0.786 0.45 0.504 0.78 0.377 0.45 0.503 
Zone Outs 0.58 0.902 0.26 0.607 0.2 0.658 0.04 0.843 0.05 0.821 
Tune Outs 10.29 0.016* 7.34 0.007* 5.71 0.017* 0.09 0.769 0.61 0.436 
Overall MW 10.21 0.017* 8.32 0.004* 4.52 0.034* 0.02 0.892 0.33 0.567 
 
Note: * p < .05. In the RT models, the predictor variable was the magnitude of the congruency sequence effect (CSE) in raw, unstandardized RT, 
whereas in the zRT models the CSE was based on standardized RT. MW = Mind-Wandering. 
 
